**Ian Bremmer:** 0:00

digital world order. It's increasingly run by tech companies that are sovereign in that space, and that's particularly true in AI, where the foundational models and what they do, what their inputs are, the data they train on all of that stuff is determined. The rule set of how you as a human being, as a citizen, as a consumer, will engage with them. Those things are determined wholly by the people that are running the tech company. I do believe that there is a very, very tall mountain to climb to have effective governance of that space and, unlike on climate change, where it started late but at least it's comparatively slow moving I mean, I know it doesn't feel that way because of all the things that are happening in the world on climate, but you know, at the end of the day, like we still have years in principle to state a 1.5 degrees centigrade, and if we don't, it'll be two, and we're kind of we have the ability over decades to course correct.

**Craig Smith:** 0:59

Hi, my name is Craig Smith and this is Eye on AI. Today, I have Ian Bremer with me, the renowned political scientist, to talk about AI regulation, the potential for a global regulatory framework and the role of nation states in AI development. Ian also talked about who should be held accountable for AI harm and the US, China, competition and collaboration over the technology. I hope you find the conversation as engrossing as I did. Ai might be the most important new computer technology ever. It's storming every industry and literally billions of dollars are being invested, so buckle up. The problem is that AI needs a lot of speed and processing power. So how do you compete without cost spiralling out of control? It's time to upgrade to the next generation of the cloud Oracle Cloud Infrastructure or OCI. Oci is a single platform for your infrastructure, database, application development and AI needs. Oci has four to eight times the bandwidth of other clouds, offers one consistent price instead of variable regional pricing and, of course, nobody does data better than Oracle. So now you can train your AI models at twice the speed and less than half the cost of other clouds. If you want to do more and spend less, like Uber, eight by eight and Databricks Mosaic, take a free test drive of OCI at oracle com slash I on AI. Okay. So, Ian, let's start, since I'm recording, introduce yourself. I mean, obviously, I know who you are and a lot of people listening will know who you are, but it's always good to have you introduce yourself.

**Ian Bremmer:** 3:00

Sure, I'm Ian Bremmer, a political scientist, and I'm president of Eurasia Group.

**Craig Smith:** 3:05

I'm interested personally about your journey, about how you got to not only running the Eurasia Group but making the Eurasia Group as prominent as it's become. Can you just talk a little bit about how you developed the organisation and your profile?

**Ian Bremmer:** 3:30

Well, I mean, it's always been a misnomer in the sense that when I started it, it was focused just on Eurasia, but it wasn't a group, it was just me, it was Eurasia Guy, which doesn't sound very credible as an organisation and as I started getting clients that wanted access to the research that I was doing as a political scientist, as a former academic, and I started hiring people and I've done it now for 26 years. I started with nothing and now it's a big company Globally. We've got about 250 folks. It's just kind of a really cool political science story. It's for someone who really cares about trying to understand the world, and that really matters to me because I think the world is becoming a much more dangerous place.

**Craig Smith:** 4:19

You've spent a lot of time recently talking about AI regulation in particular and I read your piece in Foreign Affairs with Mustafa Suleiman and you guys talked about developing a regulatory framework or a kind of a stocked framework with various levels. Does that represent your latest thinking or has your thinking evolved? In that piece you talked about a three-tier regulatory framework. I'd be interested in hearing about that. I'd also be interested in hearing what you are thinking about AI development in general.

**Ian Bremmer:** 5:08

I mean, look, it's evolved in the sense that the field is changing very quickly. There has been some regulatory efforts that have come about since Mustafa and I wrote that piece and I think they've all been informed by it actually, which is the first time I can really say that in my career, which is sort of interesting, in part because there's so little out there and also because I helped get the Secretary General of the UN interested in AI five years ago and he's now launched a high-level panel on AI that I'm on the Executive Committee of and serve as a rapporteur. So I'm sort of writing up, hopefully, what will be the global direction of governance on AI. So again, for the first time in my life, I'm sort of a policy practitioner, even though I don't in any way think of myself that way. But again, this is a very, very fast-moving space. That's my kind of immodest rejoinder to how I would answer the question. It's changing. It's changing a lot because of my experience in the field, as much as the field is changing. But yeah, look, I mean I guess I want to say a couple of things to start. The first is a level of humility about what governance can do, given how fast the technology is moving, the utter lack of interest in any of the technology companies, the leaders of those companies, in slowing down at all. They want to speed up because this is a very well-funded, extremely smart group of people that have competitors breathing down their neck, and so I mean they're not the bad people, but I mean their incentives are overwhelmingly to get this out and faster, faster, faster, right. So you put those things together and the fact what I call a technopolar world, that when we talk about the digital world order, it's increasingly run by tech companies that are sovereign in that space, and that's particularly true in AI, where the foundational models and what they do, what their inputs are, the data they train on all of that stuff is determined. The rule set of how you as a human being, as a citizen, as a consumer, will engage with them. Those things are determined wholly, wholly by the people that are running the tech companies. So I do believe that there is a very, very tall mountain to climb to have effective governance of that space, and I would argue the technology is moving a lot faster than the governance is, even though in the last 12 months, the governance has been a priority. It's been urgent. It's been on the top three, top five issues of all the major policy leaders around the world that you speak with and I'm very heartened by that and they are legitimately trying to figure out what to do. They are not coming to the table with preconceived notions of these are the equities that I must defend. So that's all to the good, but it is starting late and unlike on climate change, where it started late but at least it's comparatively slow moving. I mean, I know it doesn't feel that way because of all the things that are happening in the world on climate, but at the end of the day, like we still have years in principle to state a 1.5 degrees centigrade, and if we don't, it'll be too and we have the ability over decades to course correct and have some impact on the world. You don't have generations on AI, you've got years. You've got years, a single year. So that's the backdrop, that's the context for talking about the geopolitics of AI, the governance of AI.

**Craig Smith:** 9:20

Yeah, I talk to a guy periodically. Do you know Conor Lee? He's a smart guy, he's young and a bit of a rebel, but he had this group, a Luther AI. He now has a startup focused on alignment, but Luther AI developed the first open source large language model, gptj, and has gone on to develop larger models and he's now very focused on regulation and he says some very interesting things that I just wanted to hear, which you had in foreign affairs is kind of high level framework, but in terms of specific regulations, he says, for example, the world got together and decided that human cloning is a bad thing or that we're not ready to go there, and it was banned globally through various structures. Is that possible with AI? Could you set a limit on how many Flops per training session or how large? I mean the computer is an easy thing to track. I mean, is that one of the things that one of these global bodies, or at least nation states, could do? Just outright ban something?

**Ian Bremmer:** 11:17

So, first of all, it's the right question to ask. It's a very interesting question and as a political scientist, I would start by answering it. As if you were asking that question of nuclear weapons after the Americans and Soviets already had a bunch and said well, I mean, in principle, couldn't we just ban them, because it's obvious that we don't want them? It's obvious they're incredibly dangerous. We don't think they're usable. We're really worried about proliferation. We're really worried about what could happen in the world if we keep building them as it turned out. We believe it at least. Once we were one in three at destroying humanity as a consequence of them. So it's a really bad idea to have them around. And yet and we've got countries down with, like Pakistan and North Korea, that we clearly don't want to have nuclear weapons. It's utterly unacceptable. We can't do anything about it, and so the genie is out of the bottle and we cannot wish it away. There is way too much money, there are way too many powerful companies with influence, it matters way too much for growth, there is already way too much proliferation and the geopolitics are already way too competitive. If we don't do it, somebody else will strategically never mind, technologically, never mind from a business perspective? So, for all of those reasons, absolutely not. You saw, there was this one letter that was signed by a number of sort of AI, let's say, concerned enthusiasts and scientists, and it got, I think, several thousand people signing it, a lot of whom actually mattered. It was only to limit one very small part of AI development and it went absolutely nowhere immediately, as anyone touching the field could have told you it was going to. So we've now had this high level UN panel together for several months. We've put out our interim draft report and that question that you just raised and remember this is 35 plus people, public sector, private sector, ministers, public policy types. It's a really good cross-section globally of people with expertise and power over and around AI, all over the world. That question that you just raised has not taken up a moment of conversation over the months of our meetings, not in any working group, has not been discussed, because it's not relevant, it's not credible, it's not anything that we think we could put muscle into. Now, keep in mind, when you're working at the global level, you understand that the United Nations has no power. Number two the United Nations has no money. What it has is legitimacy at the global level of voice. It actually brings everyone together. So you can try to understand what the lowest common denominator is, you can steer it, you can create analytic ground, truth that everyone can come together around, which is a really important thing to do in my view and occasionally, especially if you have a crisis, you can raise the lowest common denominator at least among a group of players, a subset of players, and maybe you can then broaden it out. Those are all worthy goals. The question that you just asked me: can you just stop it from happening? Some level? No, no, that is several factors of extrapolation beyond what anyone thinks is remotely possible.

**Craig Smith:** 14:58

Even so, because this is not the level of computation we're talking about. I'm talking about a massive computer, something that no one has reached yet but that is probably in the current trajectory necessary for AGI. Just say, have a treaty between the US and China and Russia in France, maybe that no training session or no AI system can go beyond a certain number of floating point operations per second and set it high beyond what's being done today, just as a limit. You don't think that would work.

**Ian Bremmer:** 15:52

Oh, I mean, that's an interesting thought experiment for the future. So a couple of caveats before I try to answer that question. The first is we don't know what the state and diffusion of computers will be like when that conversation becomes more relevant, in other words, how many actors will have access to it. Is it going to continue to become logarithmically more expensive, as it is presently projected to be using the same kinds of energy inputs, for example, that only a small number of states would have? Because if that's the case, then it's no longer a massively proliferating technology. It's something that only the US government, together with tech companies, and the Chinese government, together with tech companies, can probably do. So you won't need a treaty, because it won't be relevant. And then there's just a question of what mutually assured destruction looks like and what the Americans and Chinese decide to share. So it becomes a geopolitical question. That's one point. The second point is to what extent the advances in AI technology are likely to continue to be on the back of more and more explosive data sets, which have enormous amounts of garbage in them, or is it on the basis of more finely trained data that is smaller that you have confidence in, and that's a very different kind of advance that will be massively more available at lower scale to governments, to companies, to rogue actors, you name it. Now I also would say that the AGI question is. I mean, I am worried about so many other things and excited about so many other things in AI. Before we remotely get to whether or not an AGI is either technically or even philosophically possible. I'm much more concerned about people destroying the planet using AI than I am about destroying humanity, I should say than I am about robots taking over, about artificial intelligence becoming sentient. I just think that what we have right now is an incredibly powerful, incredibly economically disruptive for good and for bad, and politically disruptive for good and for bad new technology that very soon everyone is going to have in their hands and be able to do stuff with it, and we are not ready for that. We're not ready for the economic upside, but I'm sure we'll figure away. But we're also not ready for the economic, political, social and security downside, and everyone with money in the field is going to take care of the upside problems. Like, I'm not worried about not reaching the upside, the governance is going to stop the upside because the power is all there, the trajectory is there. I'm worried about the stuff that people aren't spending the money and time on, because, again, I'm a political scientist. That's what I'm paid to do. That's my concern.

**Craig Smith:** 19:08

Yeah, another question that I'm sorry to dive into.

**Ian Bremmer:** 19:12

I ask you, why did you start with AGI? Is it just because that's the really big, high level, long term existential thing, or are you more concerned about it than I am?

**Craig Smith:** 19:21

AGI I'm not concerned about and I think, as I mentioned AGI, it's something that we'd want to control. If it ever happens, we'd want to have controls in place to prevent it if we don't want it to happen. But I thought the idea of limiting the amount of compute that can be marshalled for any particular AI system as a practical way of guarding against not necessarily AGI but just super powerful systems, I thought that was an interesting idea. The other thing and I'm sorry, sort of to dive right into the specifics of regulation, but to me that's more interesting than then you have this body and it's going to be responsible for this and that body is going to be responsible for that. It's the specifics that interest me. Another big question that's been debated in the EU AI Act is the responsibility of model developers or model purveyors. Where do you stand on that? Because, again, I know this is a frustration for me in the gun debate that gun manufacturers are free of liability, and that's in social media. The social media companies are free of liability. And there's been a lot recently about the plastics industry. I don't know where that debate started, but people saying, hey, you know, the plastics industry knew that this was going to be a problem and they just shifted it to the consumer with this whole. You know you should be recycling, so is there should? Should these potential harms fall on the model developers, and that would be a way of creating some. Some caution on their part.

**Ian Bremmer:** 21:41

They certainly have to have some level of accountability. How much of it is solely on them? How much of it is shared in the industry? How much of it is with government actors? That's where the decision has to be made. But your question is obvious, because I mean these companies. It turns out Americans are incredible capitalists. When we talk about profit, we understand where the profits are being made. We know how to build business models that will create extraordinary, world changing enterprises and we make sure that shareholders get it and that that's driven a lot of growth. But when it comes to losses, we are the world's best socialists. We really want to make sure that we socialise those losses, not on me, it's on the public. It's on the general public, and preferably it's on the general public in the future, so that we don't have to pay for it. Our kids do. Whether you talk about climate change and carbon and methane emissions, whether you talk about plastics, deforestation, biodiversity, social media you name it right and AI, of course, is the same thing. Now we have completely failed on social media. Completely failed, and I think everyone knows this. It is addictive, it is horrible for our children, it is damaging them in ways that we do not know or understand. We absolutely would. If this was a GMO, that was a vaccine, we would have testing regulations before we would allow them to be injected into the bloodstream, the consciousness of our kids. And yet here we're testing them real time on people, on societies, on democracies, and you see the implications. It is undermining American democracy. We are exporting tools that undermine democracy around the world. That is not the United States I grew up in and we now have AI and it's a much more powerful version of the social media challenge. So, yes, I believe that foundational models need to be tested and that there needs to be transparency around that. There needs to be red teaming that should be done by folks that are either outside of the organisation or, if they're inside, there is some level of outside participation so that you know exactly what's being done, but not just in terms of breaking the model to have it do things that the company doesn't want it to do, but also in terms of testing the actual business model on society. We want to understand what it means when AI bots are released and people use them Before they are released broadly. We kind of need to know what's the impact on society and if the companies really don't want that, then there needs to be some level of legal recourse to help ensure that they are accountable for damages that eventually might occur. My point here is not that there's a fundamental problem with, like, an advertising driven model for social media or the monetization models that the AI companies will soon roll out everywhere around the world. Rather, I'm saying that all of the money that is made from them also means that those profits will need to pay for the social costs that come from those business models. And there are two ways to pay the social costs. You can pay them ex ante, by testing and trying to help ensure that those costs are limited, or ex post, once the costs have already occurred and you need to clean it up. And that would be true for a company that's dumping its waste and ends up causing cancer and a bunch of people in a community, as I saw growing next to where I grew up, like in a Wooburn Massachusetts and stuff like that, or it's going to be true for AI. But these are all challenges where the business model does not yet account for public goods that matter, that are part of GDP. That's a fundamental issue.

**Craig Smith:** 25:53

If, by shifting responsibility to the model developers, to me that would immediately clean up the problem, model developers would be terrified of putting something into the public space that could be abused or could cause real harm. Do you think that that's a serious consideration in the United States or in the EU?

**Ian Bremmer:** 26:23

Well, even in the EU, where it would be most likely, you've seen the French in particular, but also the Germans and others, pushing back very strongly against that, because they do not want their own existing unicorn companies and nascent unicorn companies to be cut off by a much less permissive regulatory framework than what their competitors enjoy with a big market and with a head start in the United States. In the United States, that's generally not the cultural orientation of how the sausage, politically, is made. I mean, the first thing that was done was bringing the corporates and the government together to create voluntary commitments that the big AI companies were going to follow, and then there was an executive order, which is not the same as legislation, but still very much. What are the common sense things that we think we can regulate that the companies agree to? And so I think that the real answer to your question is it's going to be in between a full responsibility of the companies and some level of oversight, however inadequate, in cooperation from the governments. But it will be better than what we've seen in social media, which has been hands off and nothing. It's been a disaster. I do think that the failings of regulating social media in any way have informed some of the concerns that everyone has around artificial intelligence, especially when you talk about the disinformation side, for example.

**Craig Smith:** 28:08

Yeah, it would be more akin to what exists in the auto industry or the aircraft industry, that you have to ensure that your product is safe before releasing it. Is that right, I mean? To me that seems simple.

**Ian Bremmer:** 28:30

I don't think we're going to get there. I think that is. I'd love that to be the standard. It is not the standard I'd love. Personally, I think that governments are in a better position to make policy than corporations. They have more people focused on it, they have the resources, they have the experience. There are lots of problems with governments, but when it comes to making public policy in the public interest, I would rather them do it. In this case, I think you need a hybrid model. You need the tech companies and the governments doing it together, because the governments don't understand it. It's moving too fast and the companies have the resources and they're making all the decisions. So I think we're going to have to accept that the outcome is going to be made in large part by self-interested parties, and you'll try to restrain that impulse by not having them do it by themselves.

**Craig Smith:** 29:24

But that's where I think we yeah, is there an industrial, industrial model that you can point to where that kind of hybrid regulation has worked?

**Ian Bremmer:** 29:34

I would argue climate change is probably the closest where, the reason that you now have a cop process every year with 90,000 people attending this year and it was private sector and public sector and academics and activists, and they have driven an awful lot of investment towards renewable energy and the question is just how big, how fast? But we all know the endpoint and that's because the hybrid model at base created ground truth, created an environment where 193 countries around the world all accept that climate change is happening, it's driven by human beings, it's not cyclical with the Earth, and that we are now at 1.2 degrees of warming, we are now at 440 plus parts per million of carbon in the atmosphere. We know where it came from, we know the implications. I think that if we could have a process where we can get to that, on, a where the public and private sector together can create ground truth around the opportunities and the disruptions coming from AI, the state of the AI universe, which is very different from climate, because you'll have to update it all the time, like continually, it can't be a once a year summit or report, but that, I think, would actually help quite a bit, because any regulation structure you put in place. Any governance structure is going to be wholly inadequate in a year, in three years. You're going to need to be inherently flexible to change as the technology changes in ways that we can't actually conceive of now. And yet most institutions and frameworks, when we set them up, they're actually quite rigid because we want to protect our equity, since we're the ones setting it up. We don't want anyone else coming in and changing it so that we're not powerful anymore. Well, you actually have to have the flexibility. The creative destruction needs to be in the fabric of the architecture, which is a lot of work.

**Craig Smith:** 31:35

Yeah, that's interesting. That's one thing that struck me in your Forna Ferris piece, this idea of inviting tech companies to the table and certainly I agree with that in an advisory role or something. But in climate change, this is a good example. Every corporation fossil fuel in the fossil fuel chain has responded at the margins. They've responded much more vociferously in their PR, I mean. The other is just tremendous greenwashing and I think that at some point that's the role of the government. It has to draw a line and whether it stifles innovation or not, until the governments have the expertise to make informed decisions, I think relying on the industry to develop. I mean, that's again what happened with social media.

**Ian Bremmer:** 32:54

It's you know Well, look you can't give the private sector a veto. There is a question you say advisory. There is a question of whether they get a vote. What I'm arguing is whether or not you give them a formal vote. In reality, they already have a vote. In fact, they have a lot more than a vote, precisely because they're the ones making all the decisions to determine what AI is doing and where AI is going beyond, where the governments are even beginning to be right now. Now I'm less concerned about at the eventual tables of these, whether it is a geotechnology stability board or it's an intergovernmental panel on AI or any of the other sort of modalities for governance that I've spoken about, that Mustafa and I have spoken about that have come about in other places. Whatever it is, I'm less concerned about how the private sector participates than the fact that they have to be there. They have to be there because if they're not there, the alternative is I don't think the realistic alternative is that the governments govern it. I think the alternative is the tech companies do it and no one knows what they're doing. By the way, one other thing to be a little bit less pessimistic here On climate. The role of the fossil fuel companies was necessarily adversarial, because what you're trying to do with climate change governance is to end fossil fuels over a period of time, but I mean still. It is an existential risk for the fossil fuel companies, which is why they have acted with the greenwashing as vociferously as they have With AI. It is not that With AI, some of the business models may end up in challenging places, but we all believe that AI has incredible, unprecedented capacity to improve the human condition and our interaction with the world and worlds around us. I don't think that the private sector necessarily has to have an adversarial relationship at all with this process, but there will be clearly very significant points of friction.

**Craig Smith:** 35:19

This is nation-states competing at one level and compute is a constraint, certainly in China. China mobilised to our detriment. Ultimately, I think it's revitalising its chip industry. I mean, that's a separate conversation. I think the US has not approached that the right way. But the US has talked about building a national resource, compute resource and I know a lot of countries have. The US certainly has the financial resources. Why not invest in a national AI initiative where the government builds a foundation model and gathers expertise in a national program, a Manhattan project? I don't understand why the government is shying away from that. Because this is such a fundamental shift, why leave it to the private sector? Not exclude the private sector, but why not have a national initiative that could compete with the private sector?

**Ian Bremmer:** 36:44

First of all, I'm not ideologically opposed to that idea. Some of the reasons not to do it is because you would think that the government would be too slow moving, it's too polarised, the efforts would be changed too much or vulnerable to political change too much from election cycle to election cycle. Funding cycles are more challenging at this point, for example. But I mean, you look at the IRA and you look at the CHIPS Act and in both of these cases I would say you would see successful pieces of US industrial policy that were much overdue infrastructure policy as well. So it's not like the Americans can't do 10-year shovel-ready projects when they put their mind to it. Why wouldn't you be able to do it here? My orientation towards a solution here would be less about a Manhattan project, because I don't think it's necessary, because I think you've already got big companies that are doing incredible work. It would be more towards number one trying to ensure that the Americans are getting access to the high-quality talent around the world that we need, which means we've been focusing so much on illegal immigration but we've been failing at legal immigration and we're creating these Gordian knots that make it impossible for talented people to come to the United States. This is where they want to come. Instead, they'll pick Canada, They'll pick India, They'll pick Singapore, They'll pick another place because, number one, they can work remotely. Number two, it's just too hard to get the visa status. It's too uncertain, it takes too long. So that's one area I'd like the government to lean in. Second is to provide data. We have some areas where the Americans have repositories of data. You look at the National Health Institute, for example, and there's incredible data there. There are going to be areas where the US government will be uniquely well-positioned to have data resources that can be used by universities, that can be used by private sector players that are big, but also by startups. That will help support entrepreneurship, will also help to facilitate US aid to developing countries around the world. Giving them access to data that otherwise the private sector companies might not be interested in providing, Again, public goods to create data that have the business model for, I think is really, really important. This gets me to another point that I think is underappreciated, which is the biggest challenge to the development of AI, in my view, is not technology limitations, it's business model limitations, because the private sector is only interested in investing in areas where they think they can make a profit. We aren't reverse engineering the human brain right now. We're barely reverse engineering the brain of an earthworm, even though Ray Kurzweil said we'd be able to do that way before now, in the age of spiritual machines, way back when, decades ago. The reason is not because we're technologically incapable, but because that's not where the Money's at. If the US government thinks it's important to do that, if the US government thinks it's important to support CRISPR, for example, development for new types of exotic challenge diseases that you wouldn't be able to get people to pay actual money for, but would matter for citizens, then we should do that. We should figure out what the public goods are that aren't, that are adjacent to or completely unaligned with the business models, and where they're going. There should be an entire department in the US that is focused on investing in that. That's where we need industrial policy. That's what industrial policy should really do, fundamentally, because the market works. It just doesn't work for everyone.

**Craig Smith:** 40:49

Yeah, you talk also about open source and the danger of open source. I've been talking to a lot of people about that. I speak every three or four months with Yanlacun, who I'm sure you know is a great proponent of open source. How do you feel about that? I tend to agree with his view that open source will win, quote unquote win. One of the strong arguments for that is that I just had a call, actually I was just in Armenia talking to the AI community there, and then I got a call from a guy in Georgia who saw that I was in Armenia. He was saying, which is what Lacun says, that Georgia doesn't want an open AI's model. It wants its own model, it wants a model that's trained on its data so that it reflects the cultural norms and all that of its society. And certainly China is not going to want to have to depend on a US corporate model. So open source is a way to disseminate these models and fine tune them for each particular use case. But then there's the. You know, as Jeff Hinton says, you wouldn't open source thermonuclear weapons. So how do you stand on that debate?

**Ian Bremmer:** 42:32

Well, first of all kind of getting to my inability to adequately quote unquote govern AI. The genie is out of the bottle. I think that we're going to have crises and we're going to have to respond to them, and the best purpose of AI governance right now is to get us in the best direction we can with all the players, so that when the crisis happens, we are better set up, we're better prepared to recognize it as a crisis and respond to it. In that regard, I see AI is more akin to the financial markets, where we have a global financial market. We know we need it, but we also know that lots of individual players can create systemic damage, so we try to minimise that. But we know it's coming and when it happens, we all have to respond. Like the Americans and the Chinese, we have completely different economic systems. We have completely different central banks. One has a closed currency, one has an open convertible currency, but when there's a financial crisis, we both know that we need the financial markets to keep working. So the Chinese will have huge amounts of investments and treasuries. Well, wait a second, don't they hate us? Doesn't matter? Like we all need to have global financial markets that work. So I think AI is going to be like that. I think AI, especially when some of the models are open source and the technology moves so quickly, is going to be like that. But you're absolutely right that what you don't want are models that are only trained on data that's being created by the Americans and the Chinese, because that's going to lead to outcomes that are very uninteresting and maybe even counterproductive to lots of other countries around the world. And that's one of the reasons I suggested that if the US developed data that that can be useful for foreign aid and, by the way, that's something that the United Nations needs to call for to there should be global data banks that models can be available to train on, because otherwise, who's going to help ensure that any of these AI applications are going to make it to lower developed countries? And these challenges aren't about AI themselves. It's also about hard infrastructure. I mean, if 45% of Africa doesn't have electricity, then don't tell me how you're going to get them AI. You got to get them electricity first. So these are I mean, ai is going to be such a force multiplier for human capital, but only in places where human capital can already access the markets. So, for those that can't write. The explosion of inequality is going to become much greater, much more desperate, much more volatile, and we need to be aware of that, prepared for that.

**Craig Smith:** 45:04

You say the genies out of the bottle, but it doesn't mean it's too late to regulate them. And one thing that surprised me is that I'm saying you're not going to stop them.

**Ian Bremmer:** 45:17

In other words, I mean like when you look at the US, you know executive order. There was massive disagreement between the corporations of whether or not you should go closed model or open source and, as a consequence, you didn't end up getting any regulation in the executive order.

**Craig Smith:** 45:34

As I mentioned, lowest common denominator among really powerful players Do you think that companies that deploy these models, whether it be closed or open source, should be legislated to reveal their training data to at least to a regulatory body?

**Ian Bremmer:** 45:59

I don't know. I mean, that's a better question for Mustafa than it is for me. He has the technological expertise. I certainly do. I'm not opposed to it in principle, but I can. I can certainly see environments where that would be considered proprietary for good reason. You know you'd be more interested in the test results and in a transparent process around the testing and the testing needs to be much broader than it presently is than I am around the nature of the data itself. Certainly, I can see that. That strikes me as likely to occur in China, but it's hard to see that happening.

**Craig Smith:** 46:39

It just surprises me, for example in the New York Times open AI case, that or even llama to an open source model. No one knows what data was trained on and it puts the public at a disadvantage if you're trying to protect your data from being included in the training data of these large models.

**Ian Bremmer:** 47:14

Look, I think there's going to be a. There's a huge question, as we think, about the next couple generations of AI, about whether they're going to be massively centralised or massively decentralised. You know, I don't think we know yet. I mean, I think that the most important question to me in terms of affecting society and affecting you and me as human beings is when we all have AI bots that are trainable on our data, all of our individual data, so that they're maximally useful to us, because right now, you and I are using the same AI bots and they're all trained on the same corpus. And when we have the ability to have our individual bot, that is our AI. It's so important that we would never turn it off. It really becomes a part of us as human beings, and this is, you know, if anything makes us more than homo deus, this is the I mean excuse me, do that again If anything makes us more than homo sapiens but not homo deus, this is the next step is when we're actually full time using an AI that is trained on our individual corpus. Now my big question is when that happens, to what extent is that data ours and to what extent does that data belong to a much bigger company that is using it with other data for purposes that we have no say in and that will. The business model will determine that. The CEO will determine that. I hope that is something that governments will have something to say about to be able to nudge. But historically it's been the technology in the business model that's driven most of these answers and not the government.

**Craig Smith:** 48:47

Okay, this will be my last question. I'm sure you and Mustafa talked about this, about using AI in AI government, the governance, and you talked in that piece about auditing and that sort of thing. You know, that sounds to me like a perfect use case for a large model to be able to look at other models and understand what they're doing or maybe have access to the training data. Have you guys talked about that?

**Ian Bremmer:** 49:30

We have, and you know. My view is you'd want that to be AI crowdsourced. I mean, if you've got, you know, 10 or 15 or 20 great models out there, you should be applying all of them to AI governance of specific issues and you should be determining what they together have to say. The wisdom of crowds has nothing on the future wisdom of AI crowds, and that's right now. Most people use AI individually, which makes no sense to me whatsoever. They're trained on different data. You'd want to be able to crowdsource it. If you get enough AI out there, eventually they'll still be systemic biases, just as there are systemic biases in humanity but it'll still bring you closer to accuracy. You want those as inputs. I would not want those as autonomous inputs without oversight, but I would want those as inputs. They'd be critical. In fact, I don't think you'll be able to do governance without having those sort of inputs.

**Craig Smith:** 50:25

Yeah, I said that was my last question. Can we just end the US-China competition relationship, whatever? With regard to AI, do you think that the two countries will come together in some sort of regulatory framework that's mutually beneficial, or do you think that we're drifting so far apart that we're going to end up in the Asian AI sphere, dominated by China, and the Western AI sphere, dominated by the US?

**Ian Bremmer:** 51:01

I think the Chinese are much more interested in AI regulation than the Americans are right now, because they understand the threat that it poses to a government that wants control over information. The Americans don't seem to worry about that, but increasingly we will. I mean, I have seen the Chinese be constructive, both in the UN process but also with the Americans, in accepting, at the recent APEC summit between Biden and Xi, the idea of a track 1.5 on AI, bringing the governments and private sector members together. Now we don't know who those members are yet. The Chinese have not decided. It's still early, but I think the Chinese have an interest in being constructive around this. The problem is and it gets to something you teased a little earlier in our conversation, that one of the big reasons the Chinese want to be involved in AI with the United States is that they're hoping that they can find a way to stop a technology cold war from occurring. And the biggest concern they have is the American slate of export controls against semiconductors and cloud computing and the rest which, if that continues, will force the Chinese, who are five to 10 years behind the Americans and others in the West, to invest enormously in building their own. They don't want to have to do that, and it could be that, absent finding any dialogue on that issue and right now we're far from it it's not impossible, but we're far from it that that is going to prevent us from going anywhere on AI.

**Craig Smith:** 52:39

AI might be the most important new computer technology ever. It's storming every industry and literally billions of dollars are being invested. So buckle up. The problem is that AI needs a lot of speed and processing power. So how do you compete without cost spiralling out of control? It's time to upgrade to the next generation of the cloud Oracle Cloud Infrastructure or OCI. Oci is a single platform for your infrastructure, database, application development and AI needs. Oci has four to eight times the bandwidth of other clouds, offers one consistent price instead of variable regional pricing and, of course, nobody does data better than Oracle. So now you can train your AI models at twice the speed and less than half the cost of other clouds. If you want to do more and spend less, like Uber, eight by eight and Databricks Mosaic, take a free test drive of OCI at oracle.com slash. I am AI. That's it for this episode. I want to thank Ian for his time. If you want to read a transcript of today's conversation, you can find one on our website. That's EYE-ON AI. We love to hear from listeners. Subdrop us a line at Craig at Eye on AI. Put the listener in the subject line so I don't miss it. In the meantime, remember the singularity may not be near, but AI is changing our world, so pay attention.